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The primary intent of this study is to evaluate the 
Allowance and Authorization Systems in the United States Air 
Force. The Allowance and Authorization Systems have been expe¬ 
riencing some difficulties in controlling the actual allowances 
and authorizations of the United States Air Force equipment. 
The Air Force's support equipment inventory is enormous 
in both size and importance. In October 1981, Air Force units 
had nearly $14 billion invested in radios, generators, vehicles, 
and the thousands of other equipment items needed to operate 
and maintain the service's installation and major weapon systems. 
Accurately identifying the equipment these units need is an awe¬ 
some but essential task if the Air Force is to operate effec¬ 
tively. The service managers must have this information to pre¬ 
pare budget requests and procurement plans, and to use it as a 
basis for equipping individual units, If equipment needs are 
not accurately identified, the Air Force may waste millions of 
dollars acquiring and maintaining unneeded assets, or, worse, 
shortages may prevent the service from accomplishing its defense 
mission. 
The main sources of information for this study were per¬ 
sonal interviewing, and participatory observation as a member of 
a research team. Also, a wide variety of secondary information, 
books, periodicals, unpublished materials and government docu¬ 
ments, was used, 
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The Air Force's support equipment inventory is enor~ 
mous in both size and importance. In October 1981, Air Force 
units had nearly $14 billion invested in radios, generators, 
vehicles, and thousands of other equipment items needed 
to operate and maintain the service's installation and major 
weapon systems. Accurately identifying the equipment these 
units need is an awesome but essential task if the Air Force 
is to operate effectively. The service managers must have 
this information to prepare budget requests and procurement 
plans, and to use it as a basis for equipping individual units. 
If equipment needs are not accurately identified, the Air Force 
may waste millions of dollars acquiring and maintaining un¬ 
needed assets or, worse, shortages may prevent the service from 
accomplishing its defense mission. 
The management system that the Air Force uses to iden¬ 
tify equipment requirements is necessarily complex. Among 
other things, the system must forecast the support needed for 
new weapons systems, assess the effect of organization changes, 
and compute replacement factors for aging equipment."^ However, 
the heart of the system is the process used to authorize equip¬ 
ment for individual units. It is in the course of this process 
^Dean Franklin, Management in the USAF (New York: 




that requirements are established for each Air Force unit. 
The Air Force Equipment Management System (AFEMS) pro¬ 
vides a standard method of equipment management applying to 
Air Force activities. It enables equipment managers to deter¬ 
mine, authorize, account for, and report the types and quanti¬ 
ties of equipment required to accomplish the mission, and 
serves as a basis of organizational equipment budget and pur¬ 
chasing programs. The Air Force equipping program is based 
on the following: 
a. the establishment of specific equipment allow¬ 
ances and authorizations tailored to the wartime and peace¬ 
time needs of each Air Force unit and individual duties. 
b. the establishment of a Command Equipment Management 
Office (CEMO) of each major command responsible for management 
of the command equipping program, including eauioment allow¬ 
ances, authorizations, reports, intracommand distribution of 
base funded items, and surveys of base level equipment manage¬ 
ment effectiveness. 
c. the systematic review, validation, and reporting 
of equipping requirements by the Allowance and Authorization 
Section or CEMO for the approval of the respective equipment 
3 
review and approval authority. 
^The terms "requirement and authorizations" are often 
used interchangeably in the Air Force; they both denote the mini 
mum equipment that will permit a unit to accomplish its mission. 
However, "authorizations" is the official term used to designate 
both the equipment that units are permitted to have on hand and 
the reported requirements that Air Force managers use in develop 
ing budget and procurement plans. 
3 
Dean Franklin, Management in the USAF (New Yorl>: 
Harper and Row, 1947), p7 6IT 
3 
The process that the Air Force uses to authorize equip¬ 
ment is designed around three key features: (1) strong central 
controls to ensure that authorizations are based on coordinated 
policies and plans, not the views of individual commanders, (2) 
sufficient flexibility within commands to ensure that authori¬ 
zations are tailored to each unit's specific needs, and (3) con¬ 
tinuous surveillance to ensure that authorizations are revised 
as requirements change or as previously authorized equipment is 
found to be either excessive or insufficient. 
The Air Force Logistics Command is responsible for 
translating policies, concepts, and other requisites into 
Tables of Allowances, which establish limits on the equipment 
that units may be authorized. Each major command is then re¬ 
sponsible for refining these allowances into equipment authori¬ 
zations that are tailored to individual unit's needs. The 
major commands and their constituent units are also responsible 
for the continuous monitoring and feedback needed to ensure 
that equipment allowances and authorizations remain valid. 
These design features permit the Air Force to identify its 
equipment requirements with reasonable accuracy, provided as¬ 
signed responsibilities are actually carried out. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the equipment 
management program of the Air Force by looking closely at the 
role and function of the Allowance and Authorization Section, 
to point out weaknesses in the authorization process and im¬ 
provements that are needed to make the process work as de¬ 
signed. The study is aimed at highlighting the need for 
4 
the installation of an efficient controlling mechanism within 
this section which functions in a nutshell as the 'watchdog" 
of the Air Force funds for equipment. 
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
The problem to be analyzed was identified by the writer 
during an internship with the Warner Robins Air Logistics Cen¬ 
ter, a division of the United States Air Force, To explain the 
circumstances which led to the development of the topic of 
this paper, some insight into the organization and the writer's 
responsibilities are necessary. 
The Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) is divided 
into fourteen directorates. They extend from Distribution, 
which has been termed as the "lifeline of logistics", through 
the 5th Combat Communication, which provides the total means 
for this particular ALC Alert Communication functions. The 
Warner Robins ALC performs three basic missions: (1) world¬ 
wide logistics manager for assigned aircraft and commodities; 
(2) repair center for aircraft and five distinct technologies; 
(3) gigantic storage center at both the wholesale and retail 
4 
levels for Air Force spare parts and systems. The writer was 
assigned to the Directorate of Distribution in the division of 
equipment management (DSE). This area of the Directorate, the 
Installation Equipment Management Offices (IEMO), is respon¬ 
sible for effective and efficient equipment management 
^Richard E. Maltais (Command Historian), History of the 
Warner Robins Logistics Center (Warner Robins, , Georgia : Office 
of History, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, October 1974), 
5 
6 
operation. Founded in 1960 when the Wing Property Office, 
Supply Property Office, and Maintenance Property Office merged, 
IEMO manages the operation of the equipment division in accor¬ 
dance with applicable directives, and acts as the accountable 
office for equipment management according to Air Force Regula¬ 
tions (AFR). The division provides continuous surveillance 
over general and specific responsibilities for public property. 
The IEMO allocates available resources of personnel funds, phy¬ 
sical facilities, and equipment assigned to the division to 
attain maximum mission effectiveness,^ Also, the division uses 
and maintains current trend analysis for directing actions to 
improve undesirable conditions in the utilization of material, 
financial, and personnel resources, 
DSE acts as approving/certifying authority for inven¬ 
tory adjustments in accordance with Air Force Regulations to 
discharge the responsibilities listed. IEMO evaluates recom¬ 
mendations on procedural deficiencies or proposed improvements 
within the Standard Base Supply System; in addition, it also 
maintains close liaison with all base and associate activities 
to provide technical assistance and guidance as required as 
well as insuring compliance with principles of supply discipline 
as outlined in Air Force Regulation within the organization. 
The DSE Division establishes and conducts an effective 
training program for personnel assigned to material control 
and other activities and associate outside the Chief of Supply 
^Ibid., p. 10, 
7 
(COS) organization and presents the Base Level Supply Customer 
Training Program as prescribed by Air Force Regulation. 
The division serves as the primary stock fund and pro¬ 
vides equitable distribution of inventory ceilings and maximum 
g 
orders authorized. It refers unresolved problems to the 
parent major command(s) stock fund manager. IEMO serves as a 
member of or technical advisor to financial committees and also 
advises and assists commanders, responsible cost managers, and 
comptrollers in the interpretation and use of data produced by 
the standard supply system for mangement and budget purposes. 
DSE participates with the comptroller, financial management com¬ 
mittee, and the budget working group in allocation of supply 
and equipment budget targets to insure proper interface between 
operation and maintenance (0 & M) programs and the Air Force 
Stock Fund, while also ensuring that all categories of autho¬ 
rized War Readiness Material (WRM) managed by the COS are avail¬ 
able, accurately reported, and maintained in a high state of 
readiness. 
During the winter of 1981, the writer interned at the 
Installation Equipment Management Offices for six months as a 
member of an Inspector General's Central Equipment Management 
Team (CEMO). The position required the intern to assist in 
providing the team with analytical data in order to ascertain 
whether there was need for more control in the Air Force over 
equipment authorizations. The complete team consisted of six 
6Ibid. 
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persons which was later divided into two mini teams. The mini 
team of which the writer was a part, was assigned to analyze 
thoroughly the equipment authorizations of Robins Air Logistics 
Center, Warner Robins, Georgia; Moody Air Force Base, Valdosta, 
Georgia; and Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The 
other team was to analyze the equipment authorizations at Elgin 
Air Force Base, Fort Walton Beach, Florida; Langley Air Force 
Base, Hampton, Virginia; and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort 
Worth, Texas. Both groups were to tour their assigned Air Force 
Installations over a three month period. At the completion of 
the three months, the two teams were to reunite to review their 
findings. It was during this part of the internship that the 
problems were clearly identified. The findings proved that the 
Air Force does indeed need to exercise more control over equip¬ 
ment authorizations. 
III,. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The main problem that is addressed by this study is the 
lack of control over allowances and authorizations of the United 
States Air Force equipment within the Allowances and Authoriza¬ 
tions Section, Team Research at six designated Air Force In¬ 
stallations revealed the need for more control in the area of 
Equipment allowances and authorizations . This team was organized 
to ascertain the validity of a previous internal audit report 
which made the following conclusions: 
a) equipment authorizations were inadequately 
validated 
b) special allowances were used improperly 
c) training problems undermined validation efforts 
d) approved authorizations exceeded allowances 
e) approved authorizations were based on 
unverified needs. 
Since the allowances and authorizations of the Air Force 
equipment are crucial to the success of the mission of this in¬ 
stallation, any problems that surfaced especially concerning 
lack of control, should be addressed expeditiously if the unit 
is to function effectively. 
9 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The writer utilized primary and secondary data collec¬ 
tion techniques to gather relevant data for the study. Primary 
data collection techniques included interviewing and participa¬ 
tory observation. Participatory observation involved direct 
observation of first-hand information obtained during the intern¬ 
ship experience. Interviewing was utilized as a means of acquir¬ 
ing data that provided an insight into how management and per¬ 
sonnel view their particular tasks. The instrument for the inter¬ 
views (Appendix A) is open-ended, and primarily dealt with the 
daily routine of the Allowance and Authorization Section. 
Secondary data for this study were obtained from publi¬ 
cation of the History of Allowance and Authorization Sections 
published by the offices of history at Carswell Air Force Base, 
Moody Air Force Base and Warner Robins Air Logistics Centers. 
A number of related journals and books was also used. 
10 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
One of the most important roles in the Air Force's 
equipment authorization process is assigned to base supply of¬ 
fices. As representative of their respective major commands, 
these offices are responsible for validating equipment authori¬ 
zations requested by individual units. However, the supply of¬ 
fices at the base we visited had approved authorizations for 
equipment that exceeded both the allowances and the actual needs 
of their units. Air Force audit and survey teams have frequently 
found similar conditions at other bases. In 1980 alone, rela¬ 
tively few surveys by teams from the major commands identified 
more than $26 million in invalid equipment authorizations.^ 
The Table of Allowances Provides Air Force headquarters 
a means of controlling equipment authorizations. Although pub¬ 
lished by a single command, the tables are not developed in iso¬ 
lation. In preparing allowance tables for new weapon systems, 
for example, the Air Force Logistics Command relies heavily on 
the advice of both the contractors who built the systems and 
the Air Force commands responsible for developing and using them. 
At the same time the command must also assure, among other 
things, that the equipment recommended by these other parties is 
compatible with items already in the supply system and that the 
^Dean Franklin, Management in the USAF (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1981), p. 17. 
11 
12 
prescribed allowances are consistent with the Air Force's policy 
g 
of equipping units as economically as possible. The finished 
products--the tables of allowances--thus represent a coordi¬ 
nated effort to determine the maximum equipment that any unit 
may need to efficiently carry out its mission. By themselves, 
however, allowances neither represent confirmed requirements nor 
grant authority for units to requisition and retain equipment. 
Instead, allowances serve as guidelines and constraints that 
major commands and their subordinate commands must use in autho¬ 
rizing equipment. 
The commands may authorize only equipment which is 
within a unit's allowances and which is needed to meet a veri- 
9 
fied need. Mere inclusion in an allowance table does not jus¬ 
tify authorizing an item of equipment; the need for the item 
must be verified. The importance of this verification lies in 
the fact that requirements can vary significatly among similar 
types of units. ^ For example, two F-15 squadrons may have 
different equipment needs because of variations in their respec¬ 
tive missions. It is through the verification process that such 
differences are identified and allowances are refined into 
authorizations tailored to each unit's specific needs, 
It is at this point that the critical validation of 
equipment authorizations must occur. The base supply office 
8lbid., p. 25. 
^Office of Publications, United States Air Force, USAF 
Supply Manual - AFM 67-1, Volume II, Part Two (Washington, D.C., 
October 1982), p. 
10 
Ibid., p. 96 . 
13 
must confirm that the units have both an allowance and a need 
for the requested items. If both of these checks are made, a 
crucial control designed to prevent unjustified authorizations 
is by-bassed. 
In practice, the base supply office that the team visited 
were approving equipment authorizations that exceed the limits 
prescribed in allowance tables. Allowance tables do require some 
interpretation. They often contain footnotes and codes that 
must be used to determine the exact allowances for a given unit. 
They also state allowed quantities as "basis of issue" for ex- 
11 ample, one item allowed for every five aircraft. Nevertheless, 
verifying that a requested item is within a unit's allowance is 
a relatively simple check that should be easily accomplished. 
Yet, at all of the bases we visited, units were authorized equip¬ 
ment that exceeded their allowances. 
In some cases, approved authorizations were based on 
inappropriate allowance tables. At Langley Air Force Base, for 
instance, a $15,000 trailer was authorized on the basis of an 
allowance table for the T-38, a type of aircraft that is not 
12 
assigned to Langley. Similarly, units at Maxwell Air Force 
Base were authorized equipment under allowance tables for B-57, 
C-119, and UH-1H aircrafts, none of which is assigned to Max- 
13 
well. The Air Force equipment management system is highly 
■^Office of Publications, "1980 Report of TA Conference" 
(Sacramento, California, January 7-13, 1980), p. 6. 
•^Interview with Cecil Jones, Langley AFB, Hampton, 
Virginia, April 22, 1981. 
■^Interview with David Williams, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, 
Alabama, April 30, 1981. 
14 
automated but lacks the computer-edit capability to automatically 
reject such authorizations "justified" by invalid allowance 
tables. 
In other cases, authorizations were based on inappro¬ 
priate allowance tables but exceeded the allowed quantities. For 
example, the allowance designated for a maintenance squadron at 
Langley prescribed a maximum of two test stands, but the squadron 
was authorized three of the items, thereby overstating its re¬ 
quirements and unnecessarily inflating its inventory by $77,000. ^ 
If there had been a valid requirement for the third stand, the 
squadron could have requested through its major command that the 
allowance be increased--an appeal process that is built into the 
Air Force system to ensure that operating capabilities are not 
arbitrarily degraded by unrealistic allowances. 
When authorizations are approved for excessive equipment, 
the unnecessary expense incurred are not limited to procurement 
costs. Additional expenses must be incurred to maintain or 
store the excess items and, in some cases, other support equip¬ 
ment must be acquired to operate and maintain the items. 
A related and even more significant problem is the fail¬ 
ure of base supply offices to verify that a valid need exists 
before approving authorization for allowed equipment. Allowances 
are not tailored to the unique needs of individual units, A 
•^Office of Publication, "1980 Annual Report of the Com¬ 
mand Equipment Management Team"(Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Dayton, Ohio, January 1980), p, 70. 
■^Office of Publications, United States Air Force, USAF 
Supply Manual - AFM 67-1, Volume II, Part Two (Washington, D.C., 
October Ï9'82y, 'p. 116';  
15 
specific need must be identified and validated for each allowed 
item of equipment before an authorization may be approved. As 
mentioned earlier, this can be done directly by the major com¬ 
mands. A command may order, for example, that authorizations 
be established for all allowed items the command considers es¬ 
sential for wartime deployment. Specific needs are first iden¬ 
tified at the user level. Since the views of individual users 
may reflect parochial interests, Air Force policy requires that 
base supply officers verify that a valid need exists before an 
equipment authorization is established. 
At the bases visited by the teams, this critical control 
built into the Air Force equipment management system was largely 
ignored. Personnel at the base supply offices revealed that 
they did not have the expertise to verify requirements and 
therefore merely established authorizations for any allowed 
items requested by unit commanders . 
There are various reasons why a unit may not need its 
full equipment allowance and, thus, why each allowance must be 
validated before it becomes an approved authorization. Two 
examples illustrate the point. First, allowances are predicted 
on the maximum equipment needed to support a range of items. 
A unit that does not have a peacetime or wartime need to operate 
or maintain one of the items used in computing the allowance 
obviously does not need the support equipment for that item.. 
Yet authorizations are sometimes granted for just such super¬ 
fluous equipment. At Carswell, for instance, a unit was autho¬ 
rized a $1,400 item to support a radar set which the unit did 
16 
16 
not have. The unused support item remained stored on a shelf. 
Second, allowances sometime include duplicate items for two or 
more tasks when, in fact, a unit's work load may permit only 
one of the items to be used for multiple tasks. For example, a 
repair shop at Langley was authorized two transistor testors, 
but when we questioned whether their workload justified both 
items, shop personnel acknowledged that only one was needed. 
After our inquiry, the shop turned in the excess tester, thus 
reducing its authorization by $600.00. A similar situation at 
Carswell involved five duplicate electronic test equipment items 
valued at $4,000; both the shop personnel and local command 
officials agreed that only one of each item was needed.^ 
Units sometimes need equipment for short periods or 
special purposes that do not warrant adding the items to an al¬ 
lowance table. In some cases, temporary retention of non- 
essential equipment may be more cost-effective than transferring 
or disposing of the items. To accommodate such situations, the 
Air Force Logistics Command has established special allowances 
to supplement the tables prepared for a specific weapon system 
or base support function. At the bases we visited, however, 
these allowances were being improperly used to acquire and re¬ 
tain equipment. For example, Moody Air Force Base acquired a 
$500 television set through an allowance which is to be used 
■^Office of Publications, "1980 Annual Report of the Com¬ 
mand Equipment Management Team" (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Dayton, Ohio, January 1980), p. 60. 
17 Ibid., p. 65. 
17 
only for retaining--not acquiring--items that are surplus. 
The command used the same allowance to improperly justify micro- 
18 
film equipment valued at $9,900. At Carswell, items valued 
at $82,000 were being retained under another special allowance 
19 intended only for equipment loans of six months or less. At 
the time of our review, these items had been on hand for almost 
a year. 
Officials at both Langley and Carswell suggested that 
shortages of trained personnel have prevented their supply of¬ 
fices from properly validating equipment authorizations, A re¬ 
lated problem reported by Air Force survey teams is inadequate 
training of the equipment custodians responsible for initiating 
authorization requests. Among others, a recent Air Force In¬ 
spector General report on supply activities at Strategic Air 
Command bases cited inadequate training for both equipment cus¬ 
todians and supply office personnel as the most frequently found 
20 deficiency. In 1980, the Inspector General's office cited 
training deficiencies in a document used to inform commanders 
of matters that concern the Air Force's operational effective¬ 
ness. The document stated: 
... it was surprising to discover, during a recent 
inspection, that most officers and NC0s--and most 
custodians--did not understand how to use tables 
18Ibid., p. 69. 
■^Ibid. , p . 72 . 
20 
Office of Publications, "Inspector General's Report 
of Survey from the Strategic Air Commands (SAC)" (Offutt Air 
Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, July 1980), p. 16. 
18 
of allowances .... 
Officials in the supply offices we visited also pointed 
out that their staffs do not have the technical knowledge needed 
to assist the supply offices. It has provided technical advi¬ 
sors to help validate requirements that are beyond the expertise 
of the supply offices. In addition, it has also instructed indi¬ 
vidual- units to file technical data with their supply offices 
for use in the verification process. At the most elementary 
level, the data includes the number of end-items, such as air- 
22 craft or radar sets, that the unit is supporting. 
We found, however, that the supply offices we visited 
did not customarily use their technical advisors and, in some 
cases, did not have the required technical data on file. One 
official told us that the technical advisors are often the same 
people who initiated the request for an equipment authorization 
and thus are viewed merely as "rubber stamps". At all the bases 
we visited, technical data on file in the supply offices were 
either inaccurate or unused. For example, the primary aircraft 
assigned to Carswell are B-52s and KC-135s, yet the local supply 
office did not have an accurate count of assigned aircraft for 
23 
either model. Such information is essential to verify the 
"basis of issue" computations used in determining requirements 
^Office of Publications, "Testing USAF Operational 
Effectiveness-A Report of the Headquarters Inspector General's 
Team" (Washington, D.C., May 1980), p. 18. 
22Ibid., p. 22. 
220ffice of Publicstions, "Report of Desk-Top Audit" 
(Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas, April 1980), p. 7, 
19 
for support equipment. 
A decision the Air Force made some years ago has re¬ 
portedly affected the service's ability to validate authoriza¬ 
tions. Formerly, Air Force bases had equipment management 
offices, staffed by equipment specialists. As a cost-cutting 
measure, however, the Air Force eliminated these offices during 
the 1970s and merged their duties with those of the base supply 
24 
offices. In so doing, some Air Force officials told us, the 
service lost the depth of expertise possessed by specialists in 
the equipment offices and, coincidentally, the ability to vali¬ 
date authorizations at the base level. In any event, the supply 
offices are apparently reluctant to assume the critical valida¬ 
tion role now assigned to them. Some of the supply people we 
talked with told us that their role was supply management, not 
equipment management, and that the proper place to determine re¬ 
quirements is at the unit level where the expertise is, not in 
their offices.^"* 
The effectiveness of the Air Force equipment management 
? f) 
system depends on refinement of allowances and authorizations. 
Errors must be corrected, adjustments must be made in response to 
evolving conditions, and estimates must be revised as new 
0 / 4Dean Franklin, Management in the USAF (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1947), p. 68. 
25 Interview with Dan Myers, James Kirtpatrick, and Joyce 
Newton, Robins, AFB, Warner Robins, Georgia, May 5, 1981, 
^Office of Publications, United States Air Force, USAF 
Supply Manual - AFM 67-1, Volume II, Part Two (Washington, D.C., 
October 1982) , p. 1006, 
20 
information becomes available, 
The Air Force attempts to keep allowances and authori¬ 
zations accurate through a combined surveillance effort involv- 
27 
ing several levels of command. For example, major commands 
are expected to conduct on-site surveys to verify that their 
units are authorized only essential equipment. Base supply 
offices are responsible for ensuring that equipment authoriza¬ 
tions are promptly revised when dictated by allowance changes. 
Unit commanders are responsible for initiating changes in their 
authorized equipment when an assigned function is revised or 
eliminated. All three levels are required to provide the feed¬ 
back that the Air Force Logistics Command needs to keep its 
allowance tables accurate, At the bases and commands we visited, 
however, monitoring and feedback efforts fell short of the con¬ 
tinuous surveillance designed into the Air Force equipment manage¬ 
ment system. 
Formerly, Air Force headquarters, major commands and the 
now-defunct base equipment offices each conducted periodic on¬ 
site surveys to verify, among other things, that units were 
authorized the minimum equipment needed to perform their mis- 
28 
sions. In recent years, however, cost-cutting measures have 
caused severe reductions in on-site surveys. Surveys by teams 
from Air Force headquarters have been terminated, surveys by 
major commands have been made optional, and base equipment 
^Dean Franklin, Management in the USAF (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1947), p. 73. 
28 Ibid., p, 74. 
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offices have been eliminated. 
The Air Force began requiring major comands to conduct 
periodic surveys after a General Accounting Office report in 
the early sixties criticized the service's equipment management 
policies. Reportedly, the survey program was highly effective 
until cost-cutting measures led to its decline during the seven¬ 
ties. A 1979 Tactical Air Command memorandum addressing the 
reduction in on-site surveys noted that: 
We, the Air Force, are about to again reap what we 
have allowed to grow-mismanagement of requirements 
and assets, failure to document, failure to comply 
with directives, etc.29 
The following year, the Strategic Air Command reported 
that it had recently found an average of $112,000.00 in unautho¬ 
rized equipment at several of its bases. In response, the Air 
Force Logistics Command noted that not only were utilization 
surveys no longer mandatory but that virtually every "hands-on" 
techniques previously used to monitor equipment practices had 
been eliminated. The command concluded that unless the trend 
was reversed "it may be necessary to live with a reduced level 
of visibility, accountability, and control over equipment as 
i,30 sets . 
Teams from the Air Force Audit Agency and the Inspector 
General offices do conduct periodic on-site surveys related to 
equipment. However, these surveys are often directed at specific 
29 
Office of Publications, "Report of Air Force Audit 
Agency - 1980-81" (Washington, D.C., February 1979), p. 62. 
^Ibid., p. 63. 
22 
issues such as operational readiness, and thus do not always 
include detailed assessments of units' equipment authorizations. 
The importance of on-the-spot monitoring has been borne 
out by the results of the surveys that have been recently con¬ 
ducted by command management teams. Surveys conducted in 1980 
alone resulted in authorization being reduced by more than $26 
31 million. As a further result, nearly $17 million in equipment 
was turned in and more than $6 million in requisitions were can- 
32 
celled. Perhaps more important, the surveys also identified 
more than $11 million in essential equipment that had been 
omitted from the units' authorizations. The significance of 
their results is underscored by the fact that only eight of 
eleven major Air Force commands conducted surveys in 1980. 
Although the frequency of surveys can vary widely among 
commands, those visited do attempt to survey each of their bases 
every eighteen to twenty-four months. They are not always able 
to meet even this liberal schedule, however, all commands have 
acknowledged the importance of frequent surveys but have also 
noted that budget constraints limit the number of surveys they 
can perform. In 1979, however, one Air Force equipment manager 
estimated that $10 to $15 in reduced authorizations and cancelled 
requisitions could be returned for every dollar spent on command 
level surveys. 
O I 
Office of Publications, "Inspector General's Report of 
Survey from the Strategic Air Commands (SAC)" (Offutt AFB, Omaha, 
Nebraska, July 1980), p. 53. 
32Ibid., p. 54. 
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In addition to their on-site surveys, the commands con¬ 
duct "desk-top" audits of units' requirements. At many commands, 
these reviews have been largely limited to authorizations for 
mobility eouinment, vehicles, and war reserve material. Reviews 
of "non-mobility" and base support equipment have generally been 
done on a "spot-check" basis but have still produced significant 
results. For example, a recent review found $135,000.00 in 
audiovisual equipment authorizations that exceeded the units 
maximum allowances. Desk-top audits have also been used with 
considerable success at many Air Commands. In 1980, the com¬ 
mands used the technique to eliminate more than $2.4 million in 
unnecessary authorizations and more than $571,000.00 in pre- 
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viously unidentified equipment. 
Each month, the Air Logistics Command publishes hundreds 
of changes to its allowance tables. It is essential that pre¬ 
viously established equipment authorizations be modified to re¬ 
flect these changes. When an allowance is reduced, for instance, 
a unit previously authorized the maximum quantity must turn in 
the newly excess items and have its authorization reduced accord¬ 
ingly. Conversely, newly allowed items may have to be added to 
maintain its operational capability. 
To ensure that these changes are made, the supply offices 
are required to compare each group of monthly allowance changes 
with the authorization records of affected units. In practice, 
however, the supply offices at Langley, Carswell, and Robins, 
^Office of Publications, "Report of Air Force Audit 
Agency - 1980-81" (Washington, D.C., February 1979), p. 68. 
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frequently fail to make the required changes to their units 
equipment authorizations, The office at Carswell does not even 
attempt to perform the required monthly comparison of allowance 
34 
changes and authorizations. The office at Langley makes the 
comparison, but the ultimate results fall short of the quality 
35 
control called for by Air Force policy. The office at Robins 
3 6 makes comparisons, but does not do so consistently. For 
example, we reviewed twenty-five authorizations and found that 
more than 28 percent of them either had not been updated or had 
been updated incorrectly. 
Officials at both Langley and Carswell stated that shor¬ 
tage of trained personnel have prevented their supply office from 
doing the analysis needed to keep authorizations within current 
allowance limits. 
The Air Force Logistics Command is responsible for con¬ 
tinually refining equipment allowances. The changes may range 
from a minor revision in a single line-item quantity to a com¬ 
prehensive review of an entire allowance table. In either event, 
the command relies heavily on feedback from the field to iden¬ 
tify needed changes. Air Force regulations therefore stress the 
need for all levels of command to recommend needed changes in 
their allowance table. 
^Interview with Charles Jones, Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, 
Texas, April 13, 1981. 
35 Interview with James Thomas, Langley AFB, Hampton, 
Virginia, April 23, 1981. 
O £ 
"^Interview with Eugene Bulie, Robins AFB, Warner Robins, 
Georgia, May 1, 1981. 
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In fact, the Logistics Command does receive many re¬ 
quests to revise allowances--nearly 9,000 in 1980, However, 
most of these are requests for increased allowances. The com¬ 
mand receives relatively few requests to decrease or delete 
equipment allowances when the need for an item is reduced or 
terminated. There is a built-in incentive for units and com¬ 
mands to request allowance increases when they believe they 
are being denied equipment needed to perform their missions. 
There is no similar incentive however, for units or commands to 
request that their allowed quantities be reduced or that line- 
items be deleted from their allowances. 
Only major commands may request allowance changes, but 
the basis for their requests can originate at lower levels. For 
instance, unit commanders are expected to request a decrease in 
their authorized equipment whenever a need is reduced or elimi¬ 
nated. The base supply office is then supposed to evaluate the 
request and if warranted, convert it to a request for a major 
command's approval to decrease the applicable allowance. If the 
command concurs, the request is forwarded to the Logistics Com¬ 
mand for consideration. In fact, the units often fail to pro¬ 
vide sufficient details for the supply office to determine 
whether applicable allowances can be reduced They merely note 
that an item has become superflous. For example, ‘One unit's jus¬ 
tification for requesting that a $600.00 item be deleted from 
authorization was a cursory "no longer required" statement. 
After the team's inquiry, the unit amended the statement to add the 
more useful information that another, less expensive item already 
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on hand could do the job better, 
These facts clearly show that a great deal of money 
is being wasted annually in these seven Air Force installa¬ 
tions alone, It also reveals that the problem is not confined 
to only the seven installations researched, but more than likely 
throughout the entire Air Force, It is reasonable to assume 
that this problem of waste fund in the Air Force which is but 
one segment of the military, does exist in the Army, Navy and 
Marines in area of equipment allowance and equipment authoriza¬ 
tion . 
VI. THE SEARCH EOR EFFICIENCY IN 
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 
As in any governmental operation, efficiency in manage¬ 
ment of the defense effort is indispensable in a period when 
the burden of defense necessarily is heavy. There must be ef¬ 
forts made to strive to maximize the amount that each defense 
dollar will buy. Efficiency must not be confused with the amount 
39 that we spend for our security. To assume that merely squeez¬ 
ing the defense budget will eliminate waste while retaining the 
fighting efficiency of the services is wholly groundless. Im¬ 
position of arbitrary cuts in expenditures followed by crash pro¬ 
grams is not conducive to improvement of military management. 
The search for greater efficiency must deal with specific 
improvements and take account of deep-seated causes of ineffi¬ 
ciency. Among the obstacles to improvement which have been found 
are ingrained distrust among military men of civilian economizers, 
interservice rivalry, political realities outside the armed ser¬ 
vices; the difficulty outsiders have in recognizing disadvan¬ 
tages, as well as advantages, of proposed reforms; the extent to 
which defense management depends upon military personnel trained 
as soldiers rather than managers and accountants; an impediment 
compounded by the traditional rotation of duties; and the 
O Q 
James F. Brownlees, The Defense We Can Afford (Washing¬ 
ton: Officiak Press, 1960), p . ""18. 
40Ibid., p. 20. 
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difficulty, and in important respects, different problem of 
maximizing national security.^ 
The problems of defense management are not open to easy 
solutions, however, the application of selective innovations to 
these problems is both promising and imperative. The Committee 
on Economic Development in The Defense We Can Afford, written 
by James Brownlee offers some proper approaches toward reform. 
Briefly, they are :^ 
1. Military services and civilian participation in 
defense should be made more attractive as a career, in order to 
make it possible to attract and retain persons possessing out¬ 
standing ability or scarce skills, and to reduce the costs im¬ 
posed by exorbitant labor turnover. 
2. There is urgent need to eliminate from our national 
security programs the waste imposed by pressure for special 
interest groups, and to absolve the Defense Department of statu¬ 
tory responsibility for advancing numerous political, social and 
economic objectives unrelated to defense. There should also be 
a review of our statutory requirements imposed on the armed 
forces to see whether they are still necessary, or are obstacles 
or too costly compared with the benefits they achieve. 
3. There is an evident need to make Congressional par¬ 
ticipation in defense planning more effective. Reform in budget 
presentation and adequate professional staffs for the 
^Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Pittsburgh: 
Boxwood and Wuandrangle, I960) , p. HT! 
4 James F. Brownlee, The Defense We Can Afford (Washing¬ 
ton: Official Press, 1960), p~ 26. 
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congressional committees dealing with defense would be helpful. 
4. Improvement in the top administrative structure of 
the Defense Department is an outstanding requirement for greater 
efficiency in defense management. Legislative authorization to 
make many of those needed improvements is provided in the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958, The actual task of reorganization 
lies ahead. 
In addition, Brownlee also suggested two approaches that 
were in agreement with the findings of this study. He asserted 
the following: 
1, There should be a search for an effort to eliminate 
excessive specifications in equipment that add greatly to cost 
and slow down programs but add relatively little to dependability 
and versatility in combat use, and 
2, There should be a continuous search for functions 
now performed by military personnel that can be both transferred 
to and better performed by civilian personnel, for jobs that can 
be done more efficiently by private contractors, and for basic 
innovations in management, that is, the discovery and introduc¬ 
tion of improved practices. 
43 Ibid., p. 20. 
VII. DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE UNITED 
STATES : AN OVERVIEW 
Military expenditures in the United States are high; for 
the last twenty-five years, they have regularly taken a greater 
share of this nation's produce than at any time in its history, 
other than in periods of all-out war. In large part, the burdens 
of a big defense budget have been thrust into America by the 
demands of the international system, by some mixture of Soviet 
aggressiveness and the arms race pressures inherent in a bipolar 
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world. Perhaps too, American belligerence has played a part. 
It is impossible to sort out the relative weight of individual 
influences in the international system—whether one side has 
been aggressive and the other merely reactive, or whether a 
mutually reinforcing process of fear and response has been at 
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work. Nor can one say with confidence how important all the 
international influences are relative to pressures in the domestic 
political system. It does however, seem very likely that such 
domestic pressures also play a role, inflating the American 
defense budget beyond the size necessary to meet plausible threats 
from the Soviet Union. Each branch of the armed services plays 
44Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens 
of National Defense (London ; "Yale University Press, 1970) , t>. 49. 
45Ibid., p. 53. 
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bureaucratic politics, looking out for its own interests and 
46 
the nation as it sees them. In so doing, each branch of the 
armed services makes common cause with many congressmen, and 
logrolling in the legislature, along established patterns that 
apply to many civilian programs, and helps keep military expen¬ 
ditures high, American alliances have been of questionable value 
in substituting foreign military strength for an American armed 
presence.47 While there are few exceptions, most of our allies 
spend a much lower proportion of their resources on defense than 
we do. For them, the alliance presents an opportunity to rely 
primarily on a strong protector; for the United States, all too 
often the alliance is an increment of commitment without a cor¬ 
responding increment of military strength.48 
If defense spending is higher than it needs to be for 
the maintenance of external security, there are serious costs to 
the domestic political and social system. ' One obvious set of 
costs is the neglect of socially beneficial programs because 
enough money is not available; investment and public expenditures 
for health and education suffer. New programs to meet desperate 
social needs are even harder to fund than old ones. In the 
long run, a nation's strength depends on continuing its invest¬ 
ments in her human capital; present arms can be bought at the 
Ilf) 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1968-1969 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), 
pT 8^ 
47Ibid., p. 22. 
48Ibid., p. 23. 
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expense of future strength--even future military strength.^ 
The real and present problem with the armed forces in 
American politics is how to control spending for armaments, and 
how to limit the spillover from alignments on defense expendi¬ 
tures into other issues of foreign and domestic policy.We 
need to control military spending because we cannot afford to 
waste material resources and because excessive arms expendi¬ 
tures destroy our political and social life. The acquisition 
of arms has become an excessive expenditure in the armed ser¬ 
vices. The waste discussed earlier in the research adds to the 
distortion of the social and political lives, just as excessive 
arms. Even though these waste are not easily seen by the Ameri 
can public, yet they continue to feel the "pinch", daily, from 
the excessive Air Force equipment expenditures as well as the 
massive other defense expenditures. 
If Americans are to establish and maintain enlightened 
democratic control over defense expenditures, it is essential 
to understand both their causes and their consequences. If 
Americans think that heavy military burdens are thrust upon 
them solely by the forces of international conflict, they will 
never be able to evaluate properly the new military requests 
that will be made of American taxpayers.^ Nor if we fail to 
^Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens 
of National Defense (London: Yale University Press, 1970), p." 60 
■^Thomas Bolton, Defense Purchases and Regional Growth 
(Washington: Brookings Institute, 1966), p7 167. 
"^James Johnson, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), p. 254. 
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understand the consequences of such expenditures will we have 
the incentive to limit them. Effective limitation of military 
spending depends in some part on weakening the power of consti- 
52 
tuency promilitary interests, A generalized "peace lobby" may 
help some in mobilizing countervailing forces in districts where 
the military impact is slight, Another help may come from the 
apparent fact that the political impact of Department of Defense 
(DOD) contract expenditures is less severe than is the impact .of 
Department of Defense direct employment; hence any reduction in 
military spending may have double political benefits if it 
53 emphasizes cuts in the number of men in the armed forces. 
More important than anything else, however, is probably the emer¬ 
gence of powerful demands for alternative spending and their 
establishment in the political process. Demands for better 
health, more education, better cities, pollution control, the 
fight against hunger as well as millions of other problems are 
putting increasing pressure on government resources. It is now 
very clear, if it was not before, that federal spending is not 
infinitely expansible. Choices have to be made, and money for 
defense does come at the expense of other, desperately needed 
programs. Increasingly, defense will have to fight for its share 
of our wealth and justify its demands more carefully than before. 
In this way some good may even come from the recent massive cut 
in federal taxes, to be felt more deeply as the 1980s continue. 
52Ibid., p. 255. 
53 Ibid., p. 259. 
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Because there will be less federal revenue, in the face of 
mounting domestic needs military requests will surely be more 
closely scrutinized. 
Some observers have urged that instead of adding up the 
sum of various components of a defense program to get to a total 
military budget, the total itself should be fixed at some level 
below that which is currently accepted and the individual ser¬ 
vices forced to bargain within and among themselves as to how 
the amount should be divided.In addition, a much lower man¬ 
power ceiling might be fixed for the armed services. Such a 
system, it is thought, would prevent the accumulation of demands 
against a weak executive or Congress and produce a defense estab¬ 
lishment whose individual parts reflected military estimated of 
need rather than the vagaries of political influences. 
The Reagan Administration and 
Defense Spending 
This research was conducted during a crucial period in 
American history. During a time when the administration is 
actively pursuing a policy to increase military spending, the 
study identifies and reveals extensive waste in military spending 
in the Air Force equipment system. The findings of the study 
also suggest that the type of waste discovered in the Air 
Force is more than likely present in the other segments of the 
military. Given this factual information, one could openly 
^^Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of 
National Defense (London: Yale University Press, 1970), p7 80. 
55Ibid., p. 85. 
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question the policies presently being implemented to increase 
defense spending. 
President Reagan's budget for fiscal year 1983 reflects 
without ambiguity his political and social priorities. The 
increase in defense spending is no longer news, yet, the size 
of the increase is startling. For fiscal year (FY) 1983, the 
administration is proposing an 18.1 percent increase in Defense 
Department outlays. This represents a 10.5 percent increase in 
defense spending over the rate of inflation (see Appendix B). 
By 1987, the Reagan defense budget will reach 7.4 percent of the 
Gross National Product. On the question of social entitlement 
spending, the President's record indicates clearly a lack of 
similar commitment in this area. In the 1970s, Congressman 
Parren Mitchell fought unsuccessfully for passage of a "transfer 
amendment," designed to shift federal budget dollars from mili¬ 
tary spending to housing, health care, and other domestic pro¬ 
grams. Today, such plans for cutting military spending are not 
being opposed as actively as they were during the Viet Nam era. 
Instead, if President Reagan gets his way, Congress will adopt 
a sort of transfer amendment in reverse. The Reagan budget 
would double military spending over five years, while sharply 
curtailing expenditures for domestic programs. The chart in 
Appendix C shows clearly how the budget cuts will affect the 
various programs. 
If one divides government spending into roughly four cate¬ 
gories - defense spending, social entitlements, non-defense 
spending, and interest on the national debt - one can see the 
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full implications of the Reagan program. National defense 
spending will rise from 25.8 percent of the Federal Budget in 
FY 82 to 37.2 percent in FY 87, Over the same period, social 
entitlement spending will be decreased from 47.7 percent in FY 
1982 to 25,5 percent in FY 1987, approximately 45 percent of 
the Federal Budget. 
The administration’s $258 billion fiscal 1983 defense 
budget poses a severe problem for the deficit-haunted Congress. 
The budget which calls for deep cuts in domestic spending, a huge 
increase in defense outlays, and a deficit of approximately $109 
billion, is being denounced as unacceptable by politicians of 
both parties and by leading voices in the financial community. 
In defense of his policy decision, the President joined forces 
with the Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, in stating that 
"the nation's economic troubles should not be allowed to derail 
5 6 a drive to meet Russia's military challenge." However, Presi¬ 
dent Carter maintains in a recent article published in the 
Atlanta Constitution that the American military is not inferior 
to the Soviet Union's. He maintains that our priorities should 
not be that of increased military spending, but that of a reduc¬ 
tion in deficit spending. Carter also commented that "we're just 
as strong or stronger in most every element of military strength 
as are the Soviets, but in order to get a' hard budget allocation 
there's always an inclination on the part of military leaders to 
say "we need this," "we're out of money" or "we're getting 
"^David Barker, "Start of A New Buildup," New York: 
May 1982. 
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inferior to the Soviet Union." Carter said that the tactic 
results in extra funding from Congress but warned that it causes 
fears among the public and allies and could mislead an enemy 
into attacking the United States. 
The Reagan Administration has nonetheless not changed 
its course. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the 
new Pentagon budget calls for authorization to spend $14 billion 
more over the next few years than was contemplated last September. 
The increase was requested even though estimates of the federal 
deficit have soared and further slashes in social-welfare spend¬ 
ing are being proposed. 
These facts, along with those presented in the research 
reveal some serious problems in defense management. There is a 
desperate need for greater efficiency in the areas of defense 
management and defense spending. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
^Conclusion 
Ideally, the existing Air Force's equipment management 
system appears capable of ensuring that individual units are 
efficiently equipped and that only valid requirements are used 
in developing the service's budget and procurement plans. At 
those bases visited by the teams however, the system is simply 
not working as designed. 
The effectiveness of the entire system is based on autho¬ 
rizations being established only for equipment that is within 
designated allowances and supported by valid needs. The sytem 
relies on base supply offices to ensure that these conditions 
are met before authorization requests are approved. Yet, the 
team found that supply officers are not adequately verifying 
that approved authorizations are justified by either prescribed 
allowances or actual needs. 
The problem has apparently stemmed in part from shortages 
of supply personnel who are not only well trained in more routine 
aspects of their jobs - such as interpreting allowance tables, 
but who also have the experience and the technical knowledge 
needed to assess some of the more complex equipment requirements. 
Other contributing factors appear to be reluctance by the supply 
offices to assume the validation role formerly assigned to base 
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equipment office and the failure of major commands to ensure 
that supply offices actually carry out their assigned tasks. 
The team also concluded that the Air Force Logistics Command 
may be able to provide the supply offices automated assistance 
via computer tests to detect authorizations based on inappro¬ 
priate allowance tables. 
In any event, the failure of the Langley and Carswell 
supply offices to carry out their critical validation role 
undermines the equipment authorization process at these installa¬ 
tions. Moreover, Air Force reports indicate that similar prob¬ 
lems at other bases may be adversely affecting equipment authori¬ 
zations throughout the service. Based on the findings of the 
research, the Air Force recognizes the need, for continuous sur¬ 
veillance of allowances and authorizations and has thus designed 
monitoring and feedback functions into its equipment management 
system. However, both cost-cutting measures and the failure of 
key participants to carry out assigned responsibilities are under 
mining the monitoring and feedback functions. On-site monitoring 
has been curtailed in recent years. Surveys by Air Force head¬ 
quarters and base equipment offices have been eliminated, and the 
relatively infrequent surveys conducted by the major commands do 
not provide the constant surveillance required by Air Force 
policy. Other Air Force groups, such as audit and Inspector 
General Teams, also conduct on-site survevs, vut their efforts do 
not always include detailed reviews of units' equipment authoriza 
tions. Desk audits conducted by the commands are valuable tools 
for monitoring authorizations, but they cannot provide the same 
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oversight that can be obtained through on-the-spot surveys, 
Nor can they fully compensate for the base supply office's fail¬ 
ure to revise equipment authorizations when dictated by allow¬ 
ance changes. 
Inadequate feedback from the field to the Air Force 
Logistics Command is perhaps best described as a partial problem 
There is apparently no shortage of requests to increase allow¬ 
ances that have been found to be understated. On the other hand 
however, the Command does not receive similar feedback on over¬ 
stated allowances. This shortcoming would not be nearly as sig¬ 
nificant if the base supply offices were verifying the need for 
equipment requested by users. 
The magnitude of the task that the Air Force faces in 
accurately identifying its total equipment requirements is 
readily acknowledged by the team. The team also realizes that 
a system of the size and complexity needed to accomplish the 
task is unlikely to be ever error-free, The types of problems 
found in the research were not minor, and they indicate that the 
Air Force system is not identifying requirements at those bases 
visited and probably at all other Air Force installations with 
the accuracy it was designed to achieve. The research also indi 
cates that some Air Force units are not equipped as efficiently 
as possible and that questionable data are being used in the 
service's budget and procurement programs. 
Recommendations 
In the light of the problems identified and discussed in 
the study, the following recommendations are made in order to 
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rectify the situation. Since it is the responsibility of 
the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the service’s major 
commands to improve their validation procedures, it is im¬ 
perative that these recommendations are addressed to his 
attention. In this regard, the following recommendations 
are made so that the Secretary of the Air Force could direct 
the appropriate Commands to do the following: 
a) provide the oversight needed to assure that the 
validation role assigned to supply offices is actually carried 
out. 
b) provide the training, expertise, and technical 
data that base supply offices need to validate equipment autho¬ 
rization requests. 
c) consider adding a computer-edit capability to 
detect authorizations based on inappropriate allowance tables. 
In addition, the Secretary of the Air Force should 
direct the service's major commands to increase on-site moni¬ 
toring of equipment authorizations. Alternative means of 
increasing monitoring should include surveys conducted by the 
existing command management teams, or designating the vali¬ 
dation of authorizations as an item to be covered during other 
types of surveys, such as those conducted by the Air Force 
Audit Agency and the Inspector General offices. 
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1. Describe your job. 
2. How long have you worked at this particular job’ 
3. Were you trained for this job? 
4. Do you feel you have received adequate training to 
do your job effectively? 
5. How does your job pertain to the Allowance and Autho¬ 
rization mission? 
6. What basic problems do you have in your daily routine 
as a specialist? 
7. Are you thoroughly familiar with the Table of Allow¬ 
ances (TAs)? 
8. Do you screen the TA prior to all 601b transactions? 
9. Are you thoroughly familiar with the 009? 
10. Have you attended the custodian training classes? 
APPENDIX B 
MILITARY OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT 
1982 DOLLARS 
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APPENDIX C 
h 7 
WHERE THE BUDGET CUTS HAVE HIT... 
Changes in federal spending, first seven months 






Labor Department 1.1 -72.6 
Nondefense energy 2.3 -40.4 
Interior Department 2.2 -15.8 
Justice Department 1.5 - 8,8 
Food & Nutrition, Agr. Dept. 8.8 - 7.4 
Environmental Protection Acy, 3.0 - 6,9 
Education Department 8.9 - 3.6 
Aid for dependent children 4.7 - 0.2 
... AND WHERE THEY HAVEN'T 
Spending Increases 
Agriculture Price Support 10.1 151.1 
Net Interest 57.4 29.3 
Military energy 2.4 27.7 
Medicare 18.6 20.0 
Military 104.3 18.7 
Social Security 77.9 14.4 
Unemployment Insurance 13.2 12.4 
Data: Office of Management and Budget. 
